

~~SECRET~~

Nº

93

## ECONOMIC RESEARCH AID

# SOVIET ELECTIONS AND MILITARY MANPOWER



CIA/RR A.ERA 60-8

August 1960

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S01046A000800020001-1

**WARNING**

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S01046A000800020001-1

Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S01046A000800020001-1  
**SECRET**

**ECONOMIC RESEARCH AID**

**SOVIET ELECTIONS AND MILITARY MANPOWER**

CIA/RR A.ERA 60-8

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
**OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS**

**SECRET**  
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP79S01046A000800020001-1

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary and Conclusions . . . . .	1
I. Military Manpower Calculated from Representation in the Supreme Soviet . . . . .	2
A. Representation for Soviet Military Manpower Sta- tioned Outside the USSR . . . . .	4
B. Representation for Soviet Military Manpower Sta- tioned Inside the USSR . . . . .	5
C. Calculations . . . . .	6
II. Military Manpower as Announced by the USSR . . . . .	11
III. Comparison of the Calculated and the Announced Levels of Military Manpower . . . . .	12

Appendixes

Appendix A. Military Deputies Elected to the Supreme Soviet, 1946-58 . . . . .	15
Appendix B. Formulas for Calculating Military Manpower .	25
Appendix C. Source References . . . . .	27

Tables

1. Data Used for Calculation of Soviet Military Manpower Based on Elections to the Supreme Soviet, Selected Years, 1946-58 . . . . .	7
2. Data Used for Calculation of Soviet Military Manpower Based on Elections to the Soviet of the Union, Selected Years, 1946-58 . . . . .	8
3. Basic Calculation of Soviet Military Manpower, Selected Years, 1946-58 . . . . .	9

S-E-C-R-E-T-

	<u>Page</u>
4. Alternative Calculation of Soviet Military Manpower, Selected Years, 1946-58 . . . . .	10

Chart

Soviet Military Manpower as Announced and Calculated from Election Data, 1945-60 <u>following page</u> . . . . .	2
---	---

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

SOVIET ELECTIONS AND MILITARY MANPOWER\*

Summary and Conclusions

Calculations of the personnel strength of the armed forces of the USSR, based on the premise that there is a direct correlation between the number of military deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the general magnitude of Soviet military manpower at the time of the election,\*\* result in levels of the armed forces that are generally consistent with the military manpower figures announced by Khrushchev on 14 January 1960.

Two alternative calculations of the strength of Soviet military manpower, both of which are based on the above premise, have been made for 1946-58. Both of these calculations provide general support for the levels of military manpower as officially announced, and, as may be seen on the accompanying chart,\*\*\* one calculation results in levels that agree substantially with those announced by Khrushchev.

On the basis of this calculation, a level of 3,623,000 troops for early 1960 appears to be reasonable. The trend for the period 1948-55 implied by Khrushchev's announcements, however, is subject to doubt. The calculations presented in this research aid, as well as other evidence, indicate that the figures announced by Khrushchev do not reveal the full extent of Soviet military manpower mobilization in the period leading up to and during the Korean conflict. (Note the calculated manpower levels for 1950 and 1954 as shown in the chart.) Additional independent evidence further suggests that Soviet military forces probably reached a peak manpower level in 1951-53.

---

\* The conclusions in this research aid represent the best judgment of this Office as of 1 June 1960.

\*\* The reliability of this premise cannot be demonstrated to the extent that estimates based on it can be used to support a position without reference to other pertinent data.

\*\*\* Following p. 2.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

I. Military Manpower Calculated from Representation in the Supreme Soviet

The calculations in this research aid are based on the premise that there is a direct correlation between the number of military deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the general magnitude of Soviet military manpower at about the time of the election. An extensive survey of available source material concerning Soviet election practices tends to support this premise. An excellent example is provided by the system of voting established for members of the Soviet Armed Forces stationed outside the USSR. A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, dated 18 October 1945, specifies that for every 100,000 voters\* stationed outside the USSR, a special military electoral district will be formed and that one deputy to each chamber of the Supreme Soviet will be elected per district. 1/\*\* It is important to note that, with the exception of 1 out of a total of 96,\*\*\* all deputies elected in these districts have been military personnel.

The national legislative body of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet, is bicameral in nature and reflects an elaborately constructed facade of representative government. Representation in one chamber of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet of the Union, is based upon population.† In the second chamber, the Soviet of Nationalities, representation is based upon territorial subdivisions that reflect to a greater or lesser extent the national origins of the Soviet population.†† The number of deputies elected to this latter chamber does not depend upon the size of the population. For example, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic each elect 25 deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities even though the population of the former is roughly 100 times greater than the population of the latter.

All-Union -- that is, nationwide -- elections of deputies to the Supreme Soviet are conducted every 4 years, the most recent election having been held in March 1958.

\* The text does not specify whether eligible or registered voters.

\*\* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix C.

\*\*\* Fifty-two deputies were elected in 1946 to the Supreme Soviet in 26 special military electoral districts. Fifty-one of these deputies were military personnel, and the remaining deputy was a security officer.


† One deputy per 300,000 inhabitants.

†† Twenty-five deputies per union republic, 11 deputies per autonomous republic, 5 deputies per autonomous province, and 1 deputy per national district.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET

# SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER AS ANNOUNCED AND CALCULATED FROM ELECTION DATA 1945-60



\*Either announced level or level derivable from announced levels and announced reductions.

\*\*On the basis of representation in both chambers of the Supreme Soviet. The upper limits of the ranges shown represent the results of the basic calculation, the lower limits the results of the variant of the basic calculation. See Table 3.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

Two types of electoral districts are established for elections to the Supreme Soviet. The first type consists of districts which are established for election to the Soviet of the Union. One deputy is elected in each of these districts. The second type consists of districts established for election to the Soviet of Nationalities. Again, one deputy is elected in each of these districts. For actual polling purposes, both types of electoral districts are divided into electoral precincts. Voting for deputies to both chambers of the Supreme Soviet is conducted in the same precinct. The ballots, however, are separated, and election returns are reported independently to the headquarters of the appropriate electoral district.

The term military deputies as used in this research aid refers only to those individuals on active duty who are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The term therefore excludes, for example, security personnel (MVD or KGB) and other deputies who might hold a military rank. The election returns for the period under consideration were subjected to a detailed examination in an attempt to identify those deputies who in addition to holding a military rank were actually performing military functions at the time of their election. If such an identification could not be made, these deputies were not counted as military deputies. The number of military deputies calculated for purposes of this research aid in accordance with the above definition was 69 for 1954, and it is of interest that an editorial in a Soviet military journal indicated that in that year 69 were elected to the Supreme Soviet. <sup>2/</sup> The number of deputies elected in 1954 who held a military rank, however, was 84.\*

The term eligible voters is defined, in accordance with Soviet law, as all Soviet citizens 18 years of age and above who have not been declared insane or deprived of the right to vote by court of law. The term registered voters refers to all eligible voters whose names have been recorded on lists drawn up by executive committees of local soviets, commanders of military units, and other similar responsible authorities. Voters do not appear to have any choice as to whether or not their names are recorded on these lists, and there seems to be little question that the lists include virtually all eligible voters. In 1958, registered voters constituted almost 98 percent of the estimated population 18 years of age and above. In 1950 and 1954 this proportion was about 95 percent, a difference readily explained by the large number of persons in prisons who were granted amnesties following the death of Stalin.

\* For a more detailed discussion and for lists of military deputies, see Appendix A.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

A. Representation for Soviet Military Manpower Stationed Outside the USSR

The provisions of the decree of 1945 mentioned above, when considered in conjunction with the suffrage provisions of the 1936 constitution of the USSR,\* provide a reasonable basis for calculating the number of Soviet military personnel stationed outside the USSR. In view of these provisions, it may be concluded that very few members of the military establishment do not have the right to vote and that the size of the armed forces is therefore essentially equal to the number of eligible military voters. The number of special military electoral districts has been published regularly in the open press at the time of the elections. <sup>3/</sup> Thus it is a simple matter to calculate the total number of military personnel stationed outside the USSR on the basis of 100,000 voters per district.

This method of calculation is subject to at least two possible sources of error, but such errors would not be sufficient to destroy the usefulness of the results as indicators of general orders of magnitude and of changes in the number of military personnel over time. First, available source material indicates that the electorate of the special military electoral districts is not composed entirely of military personnel. <sup>4/</sup> For example, members of the security forces as well as civilian dependents of military personnel and civilian employees of the military establishment who meet the voting requirements are registered in these special districts.\*\* Such inclusions of nonmilitary personnel would tend to overstate the results of the calculations of military manpower. The proportion of nonmilitary personnel, however, is considered to be quite small. The second source of possible error derives from the obvious fact that for practical reasons it is highly improbable that the norm of 100,000 eligible voters per district is strictly adhered to in setting up the special military electoral districts. It is logical to assume, however, that the USSR makes an attempt at least to approximate the established norm. Without further evidence it is impossible to state whether or not, on the average, there have been more than or less than 100,000 eligible military voters per district. The net effect of these two distorting tendencies is indeterminate. One may tend to offset the other, or they may both work in the same direction.

The official 1946 All-Union election returns provide strong support for the reasonableness of this method of calculating military

\* Chapter II, Article 138, of the 1936 Constitution specifically grants to military personnel the right to vote.

\*\* The fact that one deputy elected from a special military electoral district in 1946 was a member of the security forces probably is a reflection of this situation.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

manpower stationed outside of the USSR. 5/ The official statistics show that for the entire USSR a grand total of 101,717,686 eligible voters were registered for the election to the Supreme Soviet. The official returns also gave a breakdown of this grand total by republic. When the republic totals are added, however, a sum of only 98,952,542 registered voters is obtained, leaving approximately 2,750,000 voters who were not registered in any of the constituent republics of the USSR. The obvious conclusion is that these voters were registered in the special military electoral districts outside of the USSR. The number of special military electoral districts in 1946 was twenty-six. Therefore, at 100,000 per district, the number of external military voters was calculated to have been 2,600,000, or approximately 95 percent of the registered voters who were not included in the republic totals. Unfortunately, in subsequent All-Union election years the grand total of registered voters equals the sum obtained by adding the republic totals.\* Therefore, it may be concluded that the USSR has altered the reporting system so that either the external registered voters are not included in the grand total or they are in some manner combined with the republic totals. The latter is considered to be more likely.

B. Representation for Soviet Military Manpower Stationed Inside the USSR

The method for calculating Soviet military manpower stationed inside the USSR is complicated by the fact that special military electoral districts are not established internally for elections to the Supreme Soviet. Although military units apparently constitute separate precincts within the electoral districts, 6/ the total vote of these units is combined with that of the civil population of the normal electoral district within which the unit is located. Consequently, it is not possible to proceed in the same manner as for military personnel stationed outside the USSR. It is, however, possible to proceed on the premise that the total number of military deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet reflects the total number of eligible military voters even though some military voters are not voting directly for a military deputy. Thus, if it is true that eligible military voters in an aggregate sense are proportionally represented by military deputies, it is then logical to assume that the norm of representation -- that is, the average number of eligible voters per deputy -- is approximately the same for the military as for the total electorate. This assumption forms the basis for the calculations described below.

\* The number of special military electoral districts has continued to be reported.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

C. Calculations

Tables 1\* and 2\*\* summarize the data used for calculating military manpower. Table 1 gives the information necessary for making the basic calculation, and Table 2 gives the required information with reference to the alternative calculation.\*\*\*

The basic calculation rests on the premise that military representation in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR considered as a whole reflects the same proportional relationship as exists between the number of eligible military voters and the total number of eligible voters. Because of the special provisions for representation of personnel stationed outside the USSR, a variant of the basic calculation has been computed. The variant differentiates between those troops stationed internally and those stationed externally -- the former having been computed on the basis of proportional representation, the latter on the basis of the number of special military electoral districts. As may be seen in Table 3,<sup>†</sup> the basic calculation indicates a military force of approximately 9.10 million men in 1946, a rapid decline to about 4.80 million in 1950, an increase to about 6.20 million in 1954, and then another decline to about 4.45 million in 1958. The variant of the basic calculation has a similar pattern of increase and decline, but the absolute levels are consistently somewhat lower than those resulting from the basic calculation and indicate a military force for 1946, 1950, 1954, and 1958 of 7.85 million, 4.35 million, 5.55 million, and 3.80 million men, respectively (see Table 3). The results of the basic calculation and its variant are illustrated graphically in the chart.<sup>††</sup>

The alternative calculation is based on representation in the Soviet of the Union alone rather than in the Supreme Soviet as a whole. This calculation is presented because the Soviet of the Union is that<sup>†††</sup>

---

\* Table 1 follows on p. 7.

\*\* Table 2 follows on p. 8.

\*\*\* It may be noted in Tables 1 and 2 that the number of registered voters per deputy both to the Soviet of the Union and to the Supreme Soviet as a whole has steadily increased throughout 1946-58. Two factors probably account for this increase. First, available population data indicate that since at least 1950 those persons 18 years of age and older have increased as a proportion of the total population. In addition, the increases in the number of electoral districts for the Soviet of the Union have not kept pace with increases in population. (For equations expressing the relationships underlying the calculations, see Appendix B.)

† Table 3 follows on p. 9.

†† Following p. 2, above.

††† Text continued on p. 9.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 1

Data Used for Calculation of Soviet Military Manpower Based on Elections to the Supreme Soviet  
Selected Years, 1946-58

	1946	1950	1954	1958
Registered voters a/	101,700,000	111,100,000	120,800,000	133,800,000
Total deputies to the Supreme Soviet	1,339	1,316	1,347	1,378
Registered voters per deputy to the Supreme Soviet b/	76,000	84,500	89,500	97,000
Military deputies to the Supreme Soviet	<u>120</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>46</u>
Internal	69	43	53	32
External c/	51 d/	14	16	14
Special military electoral districts	26	7	8	7

a. Rounded to the nearest 100,000.

b. The number of registered voters divided by the total number of deputies to the Supreme Soviet. Rounded to the nearest 500.

c. The number of military deputies representing special military electoral districts in the Supreme Soviet is twice the number of such districts. Each of these districts elects one deputy to the Soviet of the Union and one to the Soviet of Nationalities.

d. In 1946, one of the deputies elected in a special military electoral district was a security officer and therefore not considered to be a military deputy.

- 7 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

Table 2

Data Used for Calculation of Soviet Military Manpower Based on Elections to the Soviet of the Union  
Selected Years, 1946-58

	1946	1950	1954	1958
Registered voters a/ Total deputies to the Soviet of the Union	101,700,000 682	111,100,000 678	120,800,000 708	133,800,000 738
Registered voters per deputy to the Soviet of the Union b/	149,000 71	164,000 37	170,500 45	181,500 28
Military deputies to the Soviet of the Union				
Internal	46	30	37	21
External c/	25 d/	7	8	7
Special military electoral districts	26	7	8	7

a. Rounded to the nearest 100,000.

b. The number of registered voters divided by the total number of deputies to the Soviet of the Union.  
Rounded to the nearest 500.

c. One deputy to the Soviet of the Union is elected from each special military electoral district.

d. In 1946, one of the deputies elected to the Soviet of the Union in a special military electoral district was a security officer and therefore not considered to be a military deputy.

- 8 -

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

chamber of the Supreme Soviet in which representation is based directly upon population. 7/ As in the case of the basic calculation, a variant of the alternative calculation has been computed to differentiate between those troops stationed internally and those troops stationed outside of the USSR. The results of the alternative calculation and its variant are presented in Table 4.\* In terms of absolute levels, the alternative calculation yields results of approximately 10.60 million, 6.05 million, 7.65 million, and 5.10 million men for 1946, 1950, 1954, and 1958, respectively. The levels according to the variant are somewhat lower at 9.45 million, 5.60 million, 7.10 million, and 4.50 million men for the same years.

Table 3

Basic Calculation of Soviet Military Manpower a/  
Selected Years, 1946-58

	Thousand Troops			
	<u>1946</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1958</u>
Total manpower <u>b/</u>	9,100	4,800	6,200	4,450
Total manpower (variant)	<u>7,850</u>	<u>4,350</u>	<u>5,550</u>	<u>3,800</u>
Internal manpower <u>c/</u>	5,250	3,650	4,750	3,100
External manpower <u>d/</u>	2,600	700	800	700

a. Based on elections to the Supreme Soviet. All figures have been rounded to the nearest 50,000.

b. The total number of military deputies to the Supreme Soviet times the number of registered voters per deputy to the Supreme Soviet (see Table 1, p. 7, above).

c. The number of internal military deputies to the Supreme Soviet times the number of registered voters per deputy to the Supreme Soviet (see Table 1, p. 7, above).

d. On the basis of 100,000 voters per special military electoral district (see Table 1, p. 7, above).

A comparison of Table 4 with Table 3 reveals a pattern of increase and decrease for both the alternative calculation and its variant that is the same as the pattern for the basic calculation and its

\* Table 4 follows on p. 10.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

variant. In all years the alternative calculation yields the highest manpower level and the variant of the basic calculation yields the lowest manpower level. The results of the basic calculation and its variant show increases from 1950 to 1954 of 1.4 million and 1.2 million men, respectively, whereas the alternative calculation and its variant show increases for the same period of 1.6 million and 1.5 million men. Finally, both the alternative calculation and its variant show a decrease of about 2.6 million men from 1954 to 1958, whereas the basic calculation and its variant both indicate a decrease of about 1.7 million men. The announced reductions for this period total about 1.8 million men.

Table 4

Alternative Calculation of Soviet Military Manpower a/  
Selected Years, 1946-58

	Thousand Troops			
	<u>1946</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1958</u>
Total manpower b/	10,600	6,050	7,650	5,100
Total manpower (variant)	<u>9,450</u>	<u>5,600</u>	<u>7,100</u>	<u>4,500</u>
Internal manpower c/	6,850	4,900	6,300	3,800
External manpower d/	2,600	700	800	700

a. Based on elections to the Soviet of the Union. All figures have been rounded to the nearest 50,000.

b. The total number of military deputies to the Soviet of the Union times the number of registered voters per deputy to the Soviet of the Union (see Table 2, p. 8, above).

c. The number of internal military deputies to the Soviet of the Union times the number of registered voters per deputy to the Soviet of the Union (see Table 2, p. 8, above).

d. On the basis of 100,000 voters per special military electoral district.

Several factors relating to Soviet All-Union electoral procedure suggest that the basic calculation -- that is, the calculation based on representation in both chambers of the Supreme Soviet considered as a whole -- is more meaningful than the alternative calculation for the purpose at hand. Provisions of both the Soviet constitution and the electoral law specify that the participation of military personnel in elections is to be on an equal footing with all

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

other Soviet voters. This implies that military personnel, like any other voters, should be represented in both the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The election of two deputies, one to each chamber of the Supreme Soviet, in each of the special military electoral districts is a manifestation of the fact that this is actually done. In general, representation in the Soviet of Nationalities is based on the ethnic origins of the population, as reflected by the territorial division of the USSR into republics, autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, and national districts. It appears, however, that no attempt is made to reflect the nationality composition of the military establishment, either in terms of the nationalities of the military deputies themselves or in terms of the constituencies which these deputies represent.\* Furthermore, the most obvious method of representing the nationality composition of the armed forces would be the establishment of a system of absentee balloting, and such a system does not exist.

## II. Military Manpower as Announced by the USSR

The figures announced by Khrushchev on 14 January 1960 on the size of the Soviet armed forces are the first of their kind in many years. As is to be expected, these figures are consistent with the reductions in force announced by the USSR during 1955-58.

Khrushchev cited the following figures for the armed forces 8/:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Troops</u>
1945	11,364,000
1948	2,874,000
1955	5,763,000
1960	3,623,000

\* For example, in 1958, of the 15 republics of the USSR, military deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities were elected from only 6. No military deputies were elected from either the Ukrainian or the Belorussian republics in spite of the fact that substantial numbers of military personnel were natives of these two republics.

S-E-C-R-E-T

## S-E-C-R-E-T

The decline between 1955 and 1960 of 2,140,000 is the sum of the earlier announced reductions, which were as follows 9/:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Reductions in Number of Troops</u>
1955	640,000
1956	1,200,000
1958	300,000

As announced by Khrushchev the level for 1945 was appropriate for May of that year, whereas from the wording of Khrushchev's statement it is assumed that the levels announced for 1948 and 1955 are appropriate for the beginning of the respective years. Furthermore, for the purpose of the following comparison the reductions have been scheduled in this research aid as announced -- that is, 640,000 men were assumed to have been released in the latter part of 1955, 1.2 million by May 1957, and 300,000 by the end of 1958.

### III. Comparison of the Calculated and the Announced Levels of Military Manpower

The announced and calculated levels of Soviet military manpower resulting from the basic calculation and its variant have been presented graphically in the chart.\* It is clear that the results of the calculations based on representation in both chambers of the Supreme Soviet are compatible with the announced figures.

With the exception of the period 1948-55, the announced levels of military manpower have been connected in the chart by a solid line. For this period a broken line has been inserted in the chart to reflect what is considered to be a more likely trend than would be indicated by drawing a solid straight line between the announced figures for 1948 and 1955. It is important to note that the shape of the inserted broken line was determined not only by the results of the calculations (that is, the force levels for 1950 and 1954 indicated by election statistics) but also on the basis of other existing evidence. For example, it was stated at the London Disarmament Conference by Roshchin, a member of the Soviet delegation, that Soviet military forces numbered 5 million in 1950 10/ (see the chart). In addition, evidence pertaining to the call-up and demobilization of classes of conscripts indicates manpower levels which, at least for the period

\* Following p. 2, above.

S-E-C-R-E-T

1949-51, are considerably greater than those implied by connecting Khrushchev's announced figures for 1948 and 1955.

It may be concluded, therefore, that if the announced levels for 1948 and 1955 were connected by a straight line in the chart, the magnitudes to be read from the line would probably understate military manpower to a considerable extent. Furthermore, if the premise underlying the analysis in this research aid is valid, the manpower levels indicated by the numbers of deputies elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1950 and 1954 would support this conclusion.

The second point to be emphasized in regard to Soviet military manpower levels during the period 1948-55 is that the peak manpower level was probably reached some time between 1951 and 1953. Several statements by Soviet leaders support this conclusion. For example, Khrushchev in his speech of 14 January 1960 referred to 1952-53 as being the period of peak international tension, indirectly implying that it was also the period of peak levels of the Soviet armed forces. More directly to the point are statements by Marshal Malinovskiy and Admiral Azarov. 11/ Malinovskiy recently spoke of officers released during the past 6 years (that is, 1954-59), whereas the first announced major demobilization was not supposed to have taken place until late 1955. Azarov referred to the establishment of special commissions in 1953 to handle demobilized personnel, which probably would not have been necessary if there had not been a substantial reduction in force at that time. These statements and the other evidence presented above point to the fact that the USSR probably has not advertised the full extent of its mobilization during the Korean conflict.

The curve on the chart that results from joining the solid and broken line depicts an over-all trend that is considered to be an essentially accurate portrayal of change. It must be emphasized that specific points on this curve are believed to be within a reasonable range of error but not intended to indicate precise levels of Soviet military manpower.

S-E-C-R-E-T